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Increasing interaction between university and industry is a common trend of most developed 
economies. It has received both consent and critique from innovation studies. Some of the 
debates around the topic are what the objectives of interaction are and whether the attempts 
to promote it are effective. With a sample from a survey of university professors of a 
European peripheral region, the Valencian Community, we study the extension of the 
phenomenon beyond technology-leading countries. We estimate some econometric models 
that shed some light on the mentioned debates. The results show that certain incentives and 
instruments of interaction impede that the support to every objective is simultaneous or even 
compatible and that only selected policies for its promotion have an impact. We recommend a 
reconsideration of the institutional encouragement experienced during the last two decades. 
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University-industry interaction: support to their objectives and response to 
policy initiatives 
1. Introduction 
When universities incorporated research among their functions in the 19th century, they 
spontaneously began to generate useful knowledge for society, with an increasing support 
from industry in countries like US (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000). After World War II, 
the consideration of basic research as the engine of innovation (Bush, 1945) and the fear that 
an interference in the agendas of researchers would deteriorate the quality of that research 
made university reduce its contacts with industry. Among other reasons, the productivity crisis 
of the seventies and a better understanding of the limited resource of firm’s innovation to 
science (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986) explain that the public opinion asks for a more active 
role of university, ratified by the approval of university managers. Coincident with a surge of 
commercialisation of science-based technologies, like biotechnology and ICT, seen as 
examples of successful science by their tangible results, the belief that such an active role must 
rely on the increase of interaction with industry grew. Unlike the initial spontaneity of 
interaction, this period in US witnesses its promotion through policies that try to stimulate the 
development of tangible results. Most European economies followed this example. 
Within innovation studies, several approaches have come to justify the necessary 
interweaving of universities in the economy: Freeman (1987) and Lundvall (1988) an the  
national systems of innovation, Gibbons et al. (1994) and the new Mode 2 of knowledge 
production, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1996) and the Triple Helix model, etc. These 
approaches differ above all in the importance granted to the universities in the innovation 
process, but they do not question whether to what extent they should interact with firms. 
Other voices have been more critical. The economics of science recovers the mertonian 
ideas that the mechanism of revision by peers can efficiently assign R&D resources (Dasgupta 
and David, 1994). It also emphasises that the promotion of university-industry interaction 
(UII) responds to a narrow vision of the benefits of basic research, the less tangible but equally 
beneficial links with innovation of which are left aside (David et al., 1994). Some of these 
benefits are useful knowledge, skilled graduates, new instruments and methodology, networks, 
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ability to solve complex problems, creation of firms (Salter and Martin, 2001), social 
knowledge and access to unique facilities (Scott et al., 2002). 
In a context of opposite opinions on the benefits of UII, it is logical that some debates arise, 
as  the support to its different objectives or its promotion through university and governmental 
policy measures. The rest of the present work has the following structure: Section 2 details a 
little more the state-of-the-art on these debates and specifies our research questions. Section 3 
explains the methodology through which we address them and the data that we will use to that 
end. Section 4 shows the results of the applied econometric estimations on the data.  Finally, 
section 5 concludes and suggests lines of future research. 
2. The shadows of the support to interaction 
2.1. The objectives of university-industry interaction: limits and fears 
To our knowledge, the most systematic attempt to study the objectives of UII is the one of 
Lee (1996), who in 1994 made a survey to around 1000 university professors of 115 American 
universities. One of the questions dealt with the support that they granted to seven objectives 
of UII. These were to favour oriented research in the university, to promote patentable 
inventions, to participate in regional economic development, to intensify the 
commercialisation of the results of academic research, to stimulate the activities of faculty 
consulting for the industry, to offer aid for the start-up of new technology-based firms and to 
stimulate equity investment in firms based on academic research. A majority of the 
interviewees supported the first five enumerated goals but rejected to support the last two 
objectives. The author attributed it to the fact that the first five ones represented a pragmatic 
form of adaptation to the new tendencies of transmission of knowledge, whereas the last two 
ones imply too narrow commercial relations with the private industry. 
The author made an econometric estimation to explain the determinants of the objectives 
favouring oriented research and commercialisation of the results of academic research and he 
extended the conclusions to the rest of the objectives of interaction. The results show the 
greater propensity to support UII of applied sciences, the non-significance of the amount of 
R&D expenditure, the significant positive impact of institutional encouragement and the 
significant negative impact of fear to the possible loss of academic freedom. 
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From our perspective, there are several directions in order to improve the brilliant study of 
Lee (1996). Firstly, some declared objectives of UII are to obtain additional funds for R&D 
activities and to adapt teaching programmes, so it would be necessary to include them. 
Secondly, it is not possible to discard a priori among the determinants of the support to the 
objectives of UII a series of variables, like personal characteristics or, following Meyer-
Krahmer and Schmoch (1998), the incentives (wage, facilitation of professional openings,  
knowledge exchange, scientific career, etc.) and the instruments (joint research, informal 
contacts, technological consultancy, practices of alumni, etc.) to interact. 
A number of survey studies have approached UII in the case of technology-leading 
countries (not only Lee, 1996 or Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 1998, but also Etzkowitz, 
1998). However, there have been few efforts in catching-up countries, like, according to the 
Commission of the EC (2001), Italy or Spain. For that reason, it would be convenient to count 
with a sample of one of these or, at least, of a region of one of them. A first question would be, 
consequently, if the results of Lee (1996) coincide with those from a region in a catching-up 
country. A second question would be whether the new included variables provide interesting 
results. Finally, it is possible to ask ourselves whether the determining factors of the support to 
the objectives of UII are the same for every objective, as Lee seemed to conclude. 
2.2. The effects of the support by government and university managers to university-industry 
interaction 
Another question around the UII debate is if the stimulus to the transference of tangible 
results from university to industry is actually effective. 
Faulkner and Senker (1995) have shown how the emphasis on formal projects does not 
imply that informal collaborations are not important, and that the former only represents the 
peak of the iceberg. Better than considering formal and informal interactions like substitutes, 
we should understand that informal relations usually precede or initiate formal projects. 
Rappert et al. (1999), through interviews to a series of spin-off firms, find that these firms 
think that universities lack entrepreneurial abilities, that they organize their work in a form 
which is difficult to manage and that they are not interested in developing technology or in 
properly evaluating it. Informal links do not seem affected by it because firms that maintained 
them before continue maintaining them, although they sometimes notice that faculty negotiate 
 5
in market terms that they do not master, because “the desire to be more commercially relevant 
then  does not necessarily equate with them being commercial per se” (op. cit., p. 882). 
Beise and Stahl (1998) extract from a survey to 2300 German firms that firms with publicly 
supported innovations cite universities as the most important source, before other institutions 
of more applied or technological content. For this reason, they distinguish between applied 
orientation of research and successful knowledge transfer. 
In this context, it seems appropriate to ask ourselves if the measures that institutions put in 
practice to favour UII have a significant impact, either from university or from government. 
We try to answer that question by means of an estimation of the determinants of the 
cooperation in R&D of faculty with firms, and especially, of the impact of the measures of 
promotion of university and governmental policy. We will use determinants in common with 
those the previous section, so we will try to answer whether they are coincident in all cases. 
3. Methodology and data 
Our intention is to set out and estimate a series of econometric models that shed light on the 
questions rose in the previous section. Additionally we want to use a sample of faculty of a 
developed, technologically weak, region that allows us to study the phenomenon from a 
different perspective of a technology-leading country, which has been the usual one. 
In order to estimate the models, we have data on the university professors of the Valencian 
Community, gathered through a survey made in 2001. The Valencian Community is a region 
of Spain, a catching-up country, with a per capita GDP on the national average. However, it 
has a series of technological weaknesses: a reduced level of R&D expenditure (around 0.6% 
of GDP), mainly on the part of firms (around 25% of total expenditure), a shortage of financial 
organizations of innovation, and a scarcely developed articulation (Fernandez et al., 2002). 
The universe of the survey is the teaching staff of the five public universities of the 
Valencian Community.. The sample has been 10% of the population, which means 872 
individuals. We obtained an answer rate of 44 percent, so the database has 382 observations. 
The completion of the survey has allowed us to set up the following model on the support to 
the objectives of UII, which is an extension of the one of Lee (1996):  
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The dependent variable is the support to different objectives of UII, ranged as follows: 0 
represents “no or weak support”, 1 “some support” and 2 “strong support”. It admits the six 
following alternatives (O=6): 
? Orientation: to favour oriented research in the university. 
? Development: to participate in the economic development of the region. 
? Commercialisation: to intensify the commercialisation of the results of academic research. 
? Firms: to favour the creation of firms based on academic research. 
? Funds: to obtain additional funds for R&D activities. 
? Teaching: to adapt the teaching programmes.  
The first four objectives are analogous to those appearing in the model of Lee (1996), 
whereas the last two ones are new. Here is the list and description of the explanatory variables: 
? University: university of the professor. In our sample, we will consider four, which we will 
measure with dummy variables: univ1, univ2, univ3, univ4. We take this last one as a 
group of reference and it includes in fact the two youngest and smallest universities. 
? Age: four blocks of age, numbered from 1 (least aged cohorts) to 4 (most aged cohorts). 
? Gender: dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent is a man. 
? Seniority: teaching scale. There are three scales, which we will measure with their 
respective dummy variables: sen1 (full professors), sen2 (assistant professors) and sen3 
(associate professors). This last one remains as a reference group. 
? Direction: dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent holds a directive position. 
? Abroad: length of the stays abroad, from 0 (the shortest length) to 4 (the largest length). 
? Sexenia: number of Spanish six-year term research awards (so-called sexenium), from 0 
(less sexenia) to 4 (more sexenia). 
? Disciplines: dummy variables for ens (exact and natural sciences), et (engineering and 
technology), ms (medical sciences), ssh (social sciences and humanities) and as (agrarian 
sciences), the reference group. 
? RDt: percentage of time of R&D. 
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? Encouragement: influence of university policy, with dummies enc1 (“favourable”), enc2 
(“not influential”) and enc3 (“discouraging” plus “don’t knows”), the reference group. 
? Incentives: influence of UII on the following aspects, with three possible answers, 
numbered 1 (“negative”), 2 (“none”) and 3 (“positive”) (C=5): 
? Wage: wage of the professor. 
? Openings: professional openings of students and collaborators. 
? Knowledge: exchange of relevant knowledge. 
? Subventions: obtaining public resources for R&D projects. 
? Career: scientific career (obtaining of sexenia). 
? Fear: influence of UII on the following aspect of academic life, numbered -3 (“negative”), 
-2 (“none”) and -1 (“positive”) (E=1): 
? Freedom: freedom of election of the subjects of performed R&D. 
? Instruments: preferred activities to interact with firms, each one measured with its own 
variable, which takes value one if the respondent chose the activity1. There are nine (S=9): 
? Contacts: informal contacts. 
? Consultancy: advice and technological support. 
? Practices: practices of students in firms. 
? Training: lifelong training under companies’ demand. 
? Contracts: contracted research.  
? Collaboration: collaborative research. 
? Licenses:  license of patents. 
? Personnel: interchange of research personnel. 
? Centres: creation of joint centres. 
The second model is the following one: 
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The dependent variable is the degree cooperation in R&D with firms. We considered three 
answers, ranging from 0 (“none”) to 2 (“much”). Model 2 includes new explanatory variables: 
? Univpol: importance attributed to the services of the universities to develop UII. We 
considered four possibilities, from 0 (“none”) to 3 (“high”). They are eight (U=8): 
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? Aids: information about public aids to fund the relations. 
? Partners: aid in the search of interested firms. 
? Negotiation: collaboration in the negotiation of contracts. 
? Proposals: support to the elaboration of proposals of projects. 
? Patents: consultancy for the elaboration and management of patents. 
? Start-ups: consultancy for the creation of firms. 
? Management: an effective and flexible economic-administrative management. 
? Framework: an explicit and adequate normative framework. 
? Govpol: measures perceived as the most important ones to favour UII on the part of the 
government2. They are twelve, each one measured with a dummy variable (G=12): 
? Frame: an adequate legal frame. 
? FirmRD: programmes to fund firms’ R&D. 
? UIRD: programmes to fund joint R&D activities between universities and firms. 
? UTRD: programmes to fund R&D between technological institutes and universities. 
? ILO: programmes of funds for the activities of industrial liaison offices (ILO). 
? Relief: tax relief on firms’ R&D. 
? TI: funds for technological institutes. 
? UI: funds for university institutes or other institutes. 
? UnivRD: increase of R&D resources for universities. 
? Groups: facilitation of the collaboration among R&D groups. 
? Pers: stimulus of the exchange of research personnel between university and industry. 
? Technicians: incorporation of technical personnel into firms. 
Table 1 offers a perspective on the data through the descriptive statistics of the variables, 
discarding “don’t knows” 3. The average values show that the most supported objectives are, 
as in Lee (1996), orientation, development and commercialisation, plus one new, funds. The 
least supported are the creation of firms, as in Lee (1996), and the adaptation of teaching. 
                                                                                                                                                         
1 Respondents could choose up to three activities. 
2 Respondents could choose up to three activities. 
3 We can find a more detailed study in Alto Consejo Consultivo (2001). 
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4. Results of the estimations 
4.1. Model 1: support to the objectives of UII 
As the questions on the importance of the objective of UII, that are the dependent variables, 
admit answers with discrete values between 0 and 2, the adequate technique of estimation of 
model 1 is an ordered probit. Eliminating the answers of type “don’t knows”, there remained 
some less than 200 valid questionnaires. The results appear in Table 2. 
In the first place, belonging to older universities influences the support to the objectives of 
interaction negatively. This influence is significant, mainly, in the case of the oldest 
universities (univ2 and univ3) and the most supported objectives (orientation, development, 
funds, and commercialisation). 
Secondly, the disciplinary effect is significant to differentiate the importance granted to 
most of the objectives of UII. In general, faculty in the areas of exact and natural sciences 
(ens) and in social sciences and humanities (ssh) are the ones who tend to support the different 
objectives of interaction in a greater degree. This constitutes a difference with the work of Lee, 
who found the area of engineering and technology as the most inclined to support them. 
Thirdly, the time dedicated to R&D activities (RDt) tends to have a negative impact on the 
support to the objectives of the interaction, but it is not significant. Although our measure of 
R&D is different to Lee’s, this lack of significance is coincident.  
In fourth place, the opinion on the endorsement given by universities to interaction (enc1 
and enc2) does not have a significant effect. This constitutes another difference with respect to 
the sample of Lee, where the institutional encouragement was significant indeed. 
In fifth place, the fear that UII interferes with academic freedom negatively influences the 
support, significantly for some of the most valued objectives (orientation, development) as 
much as for the least valued one (teaching). It is a result in which we totally agree with Lee. 
The new variables used to extend Lee’s model allow us to derive additional results. To 
begin with, none of the personal characteristics that we considered is significant.4 
Secondly, the incentives of interaction exert a diverse influence with regard to sign, 
significance and objective. The possibilities of improving the wage or the career perspectives 
                                                 
4 The only exceptions are a weakly significant greater support of assistant professors, sc2, to the objective of 
commercialisation and a smaller support of professors with longer stays abroad to the acquisition of funds. 
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do not significantly influence the support to the objectives of interaction. Neither does, in 
general, the improvement of the professional openings, except, negatively, in the case of the 
acquisition of funds. The exchange of relevant knowledge and the acquisition of public grants 
for R&D are more important. Knowledge exchange acquires a positive sign to favour oriented 
research that becomes negative in the case of the participation in the economic development of 
the region. Obtaining public grants has a significant positive effect on the support to the 
objectives of funds but not of commercialisation. When one supports the objective of 
obtaining additional funds of R&D, it does not necessarily mean funds financed by firms. 
Finally, the instruments of interaction also exert a diverse influence. Among the most 
supported objectives, only contracts satisfy all of them. For the rest of instruments, we may 
notice a dual pattern. Orientation and development depend on more and different instruments 
than funds and commercialisation. This may indicate that we should consider them as two 
types of objectives, perhaps according to their scope. The former would have higher social 
scope, while the latter would have higher individual scope. On the former, contacts, 
consultancy, practices, licenses and personnel (and centres in the case of development) have a 
positive, significant influence. On the latter, just training is in this case. This is relevant if we 
think that no instrument will foster simultaneous support for every objective. Specially, if 
instruments that allow supporting social objectives do not allow supporting individual ones, 
respondents will be less prone to use them.  
Consultancy is the only instrument that fosters support to the adaptation of teaching, the less 
valued objective. The reason may indicate that professors who prefer consultancy to interact 
acquire knowledge about local firms and they are able to transmit these firms’ needs to 
students. The risk is whether university teaching should not rely on higher-level knowledge. 
In the model of creation of firms, we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero only at 10% level of significance. Hence, our 
knowledge regarding the support to this objective is rather limited.5  
4.2. Model 2: response to measures of promotion of UII 
In the case of model 2, the dependent variable is again categorical, so the appropriate 
technique of estimation is the ordered probit model. The estimation results are in Table 3. The 
                                                 
5 That is why we prefer not to give comments on the effects of instruments on it. 
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first one is the full model with all the explanatory variables. The second column is the reduced 
form, taking into account variables with some predictive power. We prefer the second 
specification after comparing the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC).  
It is possible to observe that the respondent's university does not have a significant impact, 
despite having it on the support to the objectives of interaction. Actually, we can drop this 
variable in the reduced model. 
The opposite occurs with personal characteristics. Although they did not have an influence 
on the objectives of UII, some of them do have it on actual cooperation. It is the case of  
gender and (weakly) age. The former is positive and it may indicate a field in which females 
have not integrated. The positive influence of age may be because younger professors have to 
devote more time to activities other than R&D.  
The disciplinary effect is scarce, only weakly significant in the case of social sciences and 
humanities, but notice that the only discipline with a positive sign is engineering and 
technology, that is to say, it is the one that cooperates more with firms, which is logical given 
the proximity of its R&D to the firm’s needs. This picture is symmetrical to that of the 
objectives of UII. Disciplines that give more support to them are those that actually cooperate 
less. The opposite is also true. That may mean that the former are less conscious of the scope 
of UII and that in fact a snobbish effect pushes them to join a general state of opinion. Perhaps 
it is an idiosyncrasy of peripheral regions, where researchers in these disciplines experience 
more pressure to interact, and the reaction is to interiorise the objectives of the interaction 
even more than in engineering and technologies, although they do not reach their degree of 
effective cooperation. On the other hand, the phenomenon may be reflecting a certain fatigue 
of engineering and technologies, disciplines that would appreciate to devote fewer resources to 
interact. 
The time dedicated to R&D influences cooperation positively, perhaps because it makes it 
possible to offer more results. This is another difference compared to the support to the 
objectives of UII, on which that variable does not matter. 
The institutional encouragement, nevertheless, is innocuous on both actual cooperation and 
the support to its objectives. We can drop this variable in the reduced model. 
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Among university policy measures, only one out of eight, the information on public aids to 
fund the relations, the most valued option, has a significant impact, which is positive. Hence, 
university policies have to be very accepted and general in scope to promote interaction. 
Among governmental measures, three out of twelve have a strongly significant impact, 
always positive. The first is funds for joint R&D activities between universities and firms, the 
most valued option again, and the logical complement of the most significant university policy 
measure. The others are the facilitation of the collaboration among R&D groups and the 
incorporation of technical personnel into firms, despite being among the less valued options. 
.They may reflect that indirect measures that increase multidisciplinarity and capacity of 
absorption are crucial to cooperate, although the bulk of professors appreciate measures that 
are more direct (see Table 1). A fourth measure, an adequate legal frame, becomes significant 
in the reduced model, but just weakly. 
5. Conclusions 
A European peripheral region like the Valencian Community, an example of economic 
development with technological weaknesses, has internalised the same objectives of UII that 
seem valid in technology-leading countries and it establishes similar limits. The support to 
these objectives is a social phenomenon, sensitive to institutional influences (not through 
direct support but through the creation of a state of opinion), incentives, fears and instruments. 
On the contrary, actual cooperation with firms, that is an act and not an opinion, is a more 
individual phenomenon, on which age, gender and dedication to R&D have an influence. 
Like such a social phenomenon, the support to the interaction takes the form of a process in 
which it is difficult to address simultaneously all the individuals towards all the admissible 
objectives, even towards those that receive a greater endorsement by faculty. This spawns 
scarcely predictable dynamics at the time of creating a state of favourable opinion towards 
interaction. First, the fact that those who value the knowledge exchange to orient research 
towards innovation or even to adapt teaching, do not believe that it contributes to regional 
development. Second, the fact that to cooperate with firms serves to obtain additional funds by 
means of a public award, putting into question the idea that the cooperation reduces the load 
on the public budget and reinforcing the cumulative prestige of the groups of excellence. 
Third, the fact that, except in the case of contracts, the dichotomy between the (numerous) 
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instruments leading to the support of more social objectives and the (few) instruments leading 
to the support of more individual objectives may impede the simultaneous support to every 
objective. Fourth, the fact that consultancy is also seen as a means to adapt teaching may put 
into risk the transmission of less tangible but most valuable knowledge. 
Still from the social perspective, it is necessary to consider the disciplinary effect on 
interaction, that is dependent on the geographic context, among other reasons because the 
specialization in science-based sectors and the absorptive capacity of local firms are greater in 
a technology-leading country that in a peripheral region. It leads to a situation in which faculty 
of exact and natural sciences and social sciences and humanities, where there is less 
cooperation in R&D with firms, support in an even more exacerbate form the objectives of 
interaction than their colleagues in engineering and technology. A situation of social 
snobbishness may cloud the vision of better alternatives, like the maintenance of a critical 
level of basic research and a smaller investment in efforts to promote interaction. 
Nevertheless, a favourable state of opinion may arise because there exist pure teaching and 
scientific incentives (in fact the most valued ones) to cooperate, like knowledge exchange, 
public grants for R&D and the opening of the labour world for graduates. Throughout the last 
decades, the conditions have been set for UII to take place, and it is difficult that such an 
evolutionary process reverts. On the other hand, it could happen that the process, blinded in 
his forward march, stagnated without correcting the disadvantages. 
For all these reasons, we recommend that the promotion of the support to interaction slows 
down, with the aim that the phenomenon stands spontaneously, and we should study if science 
and technology policies to counterweight the negative effects of interaction can be effective. 
In any case, policies for its promotion compel a combination of public grants from 
government to fund joint R&D activities with complementary aid from university to search 
and select these grants. In addition, policies may require discarding a wide range of short-term 
measures that, although popular and direct, are less efficient to promote interaction than 
longer-term, less popular and indirect one, e.g. collaboration among R&D groups and the 
incorporation of technical personnel into firms. 
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Tables 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Variable Sub variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations 
Objectives Orientation 1.51 0.65 0 2 371 
 Development 1.35 0.71 0 2 369 
 Commercialisation 1.15 0.76 0 2 366 
 Firms 0.96 0.81 0 2 367 
 Funds 1.36 0.71 0 2 368 
 Teaching 0.80 0.77 0 2 371 
University Univ1 0.19 0.39 0 1 382 
 Univ2 0.29 0.45 0 1 382 
 Univ3 0.33 0.47 0 1 382 
Age  2.75 0.86 1 4 378 
Gender  0.72 0.45 0 1 380 
Seniority Sen1 0.46 0.50 0 1 380 
 Sen2 0.32 0.47 0 1 380 
Direction  0.18 0.39 0 1 376 
Abroad  1.39 1.36 0 4 373 
Sexenia  0.77 1.15 0 4 365 
Discipline Ens 0.22 0.41 0 1 376 
 It 0.32 0.47 0 1 376 
 Ms 0.09 0.28 0 1 376 
 Ssh 0.32 0.47 0 1 376 
RDt  30.61 18.44 0 90 376 
Encouragement Enc1 0.55 0.50 0 1 378 
 Enc2 0.14 0.34 0 1 378 
Incentives Wage 2.52 0.61 1 3 312 
 Openings 2.85 0.46 1 3 364 
 Knowledge 2.75 0.54 1 3 356 
 Subventions 2.78 0.52 1 3 344 
 Career 2.22 0.72 1 3 299 
Fear Freedom -2.06 0.81 -3 -1 306 
Instruments Contacts 0.09 0.29 0 1 360 
 Consultancy 0.54 0.50 0 1 360 
 Practices 0.38 0.49 0 1 360 
 Training 0.19 0.39 0 1 360 
 Contracts 0.54 0.50 0 1 360 
 Collaboration 0.58 0.49 0 1 360 
 Licenses 0.05 0.22 0 1 360 
 Personnel 0.19 0.39 0 1 360 
 Centres 0.21 0.41 0 1 360 
Cooperation  0.75 0.77 0 2 373 
Univpol Aids 2.62 0.60 0 3 355 
 Partners 2.62 0.64 0 3 351 
 Negotiation 2.28 0.77 0 3 342 
 Proposals 2.15 0.81 0 3 347 
 Patents 2.29 0.77 0 3 309 
 Start-ups 2.04 0.88 0 3 315 
 Management 2.57 0.63 0 3 341 
 Framework 2.49 0.68 0 3 333 
Govpol Frame 0.28 0.45 0 1 355 
 FirmRD 0.15 0.35 0 1 355 
 UIRD 0.58 0.49 0 1 355 
 UTRD 0.11 0.31 0 1 355 
 ILO 0.06 0.24 0 1 355 
 Relief 0.34 0.47 0 1 355 
 TI 0.07 0.26 0 1 355 
 UI 0.22 0.41 0 1 355 
 UnivRD 0.42 0.49 0 1 355 
 Groups 0.10 0.30 0 1 355 
 Pers 0.26 0.44 0 1 355 
 Technicians 0.15 0.36 0 1 355 
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Table 2 Ordered probit estimation of the support granted to different possible objectives of university-industry 
interaction 
Variable Sub-variable Orientation Development Funds Commercialisation Firms Teaching 
Constant  -0.30 (1.18)   -1.15 (1.18)   -1.62 (1.18)   -1.44 (1.11)   -3.91 (1.21) *** -4.78(1.33) *** 
University Univ1 -0.50 (0.38)   -0.5 (0.34)   -0.51 (0.35)   -0.56 (0.33) * -0.21 (0.31)   -0.34 (0.33)   
 Univ2 -0.52 (0.37)   -0.68 (0.33) ** -1.02 (0.35) *** -0.83 (0.32) ** -0.11 (0.31)   -0.31 (0.32)   
 Univ3 -1.02 (0.35) *** -0.9 (0.32) *** -1.05 (0.33) *** -1.01 (0.31) *** -0.45 (0.3)   -0.07 (0.3)   
Age  -0.14 (0.16)   -0.17 (0.15)   0.14 (0.15)   -0.02 (0.14)   -0.1 (0.14)   0.06 (0.14)   
Gender  -0.08 (0.25)   0.11 (0.23)   -0.09 (0.24)   0.28 (0.23)   0.23 (0.24)   -0.05 (0.24)   
Seniority Sen1  0.51 (0.38)   0.36 (0.36)   -0.01 (0.36)   0.25 (0.35)   0.28 (0.35)   -0.12 (0.36)   
 Sen2  0.28 (0.34)   0.45 (0.32)   0.21 (0.32)   0.55 (0.31) * 0.38 (0.31)   -0.03 (0.32)   
Direction   0.26 (0.28)   0.12 (0.26)   0.28 (0.26)   0.15 (0.25)   0.05 (0.25)   -0.1 (0.26)   
Abroad   0.03 (0.09)   -0.06 (0.08)   -0.15 (0.09) * -0.09 (0.08)   -0.05 (0.08)   -0.01 (0.09)   
Sexenia  -0.07 (0.11)   0.02 (0.11)   0.13 (0.1)   -0.05 (0.1)   0.02 (0.1)   -0.07 (0.11)   
Discipline Ens  1.40 (0.5) *** 0.77 (0.46) * 0.73 (0.49)   0.62 (0.47)   1.88 (0.52) *** 0.68 (0.52)   
 It  0.76 (0.45) * 0.67 (0.43)   0.46 (0.45)   0.41 (0.43)   1.32 (0.49) *** 0.92 (0.49) * 
 Ms  0.36 (0.58)   0.56 (0.55)   0.84 (0.59)   0.49 (0.56)   1.35 (0.61) ** 0.99 (0.61)   
 Ssh  0.81 (0.51)   1.00 (0.48) ** 0.57 (0.51)   0.83 (0.48) * 1.78 (0.53) *** 1.18 (0.53) ** 
RDt  -0.65 (0.68)   -0.49 (0.67)   -0.32 (0.66)   0.88 (0.64)   -0.01 (0.64)   -0.03 (0.65)   
Encouragement Enc1 -0.01 (0.25)   0.26 (0.24)   -0.25 (0.25)   0.02 (0.24)   -0.33 (0.24)   -0.45 (0.25) * 
 Enc2 -0.05 (0.3)   0.13 (0.29)   0.13 (0.3)   -0.11 (0.28)   -0.04 (0.29)   0.19 (0.28)   
Incentives Wage -0.24 (0.18)   -0.22 (0.17)   -0.07 (0.17)   -0.22 (0.17)   0 (0.17)   -0.11 (0.18)   
 Openings -0.29 (0.28)   0.27 (0.27)   -0.6 (0.28) ** -0.09 (0.26)   -0.01 (0.26)   0.3 (0.29)   
 Knowledge  0.41 (0.23) * -0.43 (0.22) * 0.02 (0.22)   -0.01 (0.21)   -0.1 (0.21)   0.28 (0.22)   
 Subventions -0.12 (0.23)   -0.09 (0.22)   0.93 (0.24) *** 0.34 (0.22)   0.39 (0.23) * 0.34 (0.24)   
 Career  0.02 (0.17)   0.11 (0.16)   0.08 (0.16)   0.17 (0.15)   -0.03 (0.15)   0.03 (0.16)   
Fear Freedom -0.41 (0.14) *** -0.3 (0.13) ** -0.14 (0.13)   -0.06 (0.13)   -0.02 (0.12)   -0.61 (0.14) *** 
Instruments Contacts  1.10 (0.44) ** 0.98 (0.42) ** 0.49 (0.42)   0.28 (0.39)   0.59 (0.4)   0 (0.42)   
 Consultancy  0.75 (0.29) *** 1.22 (0.3) *** 0.39 (0.29)   0.26 (0.27)   0.7 (0.3) ** 0.65 (0.31) ** 
 Practices  0.61 (0.31) ** 0.99 (0.32) *** 0.69 (0.31)  0.56 (0.3)  1.02 (0.33) *** 0.67 (0.32)  
 Training  0.43 (0.33)   0.36 (0.33)   0.56 (0.33) * 0.62 (0.31) ** 0.55 (0.33) * 0.19 (0.34)   
 Contracts  0.86 (0.29) *** 1.19 (0.3) *** 1.08 (0.29) *** 0.83 (0.28) *** 1.12 (0.31) *** 0.44 (0.3)   
 Collaboration  0.25 (0.28)   0.52 (0.29) * 0.72 (0.29) ** 0.35 (0.27)   0.7 (0.3) ** -0.1 (0.3)   
 Licenses  0.82 (0.48) * 1.44 (0.48) *** -0.43 (0.45)   0.63 (0.44)   0.56 (0.47)   0.12 (0.46)   
 Personnel  0.68 (0.33) ** 0.88 (0.33) *** 0.19 (0.32)   0.61 (0.31) * 0.89 (0.33) *** 0.01 (0.33)   
 Centres  0.45 (0.32)   1.23 (0.34) *** 0.32 (0.33)   0.48 (0.31)   0.8 (0.33) ** 0.09 (0.34)   
µ1   1.41 (0.16) *** 1.46 (0.14) *** 1.42 (0.14) *** 1.44 (0.13) *** 1.07 (0.11) *** 1.11 (0.12) *** 
        
Number of 
observations  195 193 193 193 192 194 
Log-likelihood 
Function logL  -142.63 -162.80 -161.35 -177.58 -187.58 -172.33 
Restricted 
Log-likelihood  -172.13 -193.92 -194.56 -201.63 -210.49 -206.57 
χ²-test   59.00 ***  62.24 ***  66.43 ***  48.09 **  45.83 *  68.50 *** 
Degrees of 
Freedom   32  32  32  32  32  32 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%.  
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Table 3 Ordered probit estimation of the level of cooperation with firms in R&D activities 
Variable Sub variable Cooperation (full model) Cooperation (reduced model) 
Constant  -4.26 (0.94) *** -3.86 (0.91) *** 
University Univ1 -0.19 (0.28)    
 Univ2 0.22 (0.29)    
 Univ3 -0.32 (0.28)    
Age  0.18 (0.13)   0.22 (0.13) * 
Gender  0.89 (0.23) *** 0.84 (0.22) *** 
Seniority Sen1 0.37 (0.29)   0.29 (0.28)   
 Sen2 -0.04 (0.25)   -0.03 (0.25)   
Direction  0.1 (0.24)   0.1 (0.22)   
Abroad  0.12 (0.07)   0.12 (0.07)   
Sexenia  0.04 (0.1)   0.02 (0.1)   
Discipline Ens -0.31 (0.46)   -0.67 (0.42)   
 It 0.48 (0.41)   0.4 (0.4)   
 Ms -0.33 (0.51)   -0.7 (0.47)   
 Ssh -0.44 (0.46)   -0.79 (0.42) * 
RDt  1.82 (0.53) *** 1.78 (0.52) *** 
Encouragement Enc1 0.03 (0.23)    
 Enc2 0.48 (0.28) *  
Univpol Aids 0.45 (0.2) ** 0.41 (0.19) ** 
 Partners -0.31 (0.2)   -0.21 (0.19)   
 Negotiation -0.05 (0.16)   -0.06 (0.16)   
 Proposals 0.06 (0.16)  0.04 (0.15)   
 Patents 0.21 (0.18)   0.18 (0.17)   
 Start-ups -0.08 (0.13)   -0.05 (0.13)   
 Management 0.23 (0.18)   0.19 (0.18)   
 Framework 0.06 (0.17)   0 (0.17)   
Govpol Frame 0.4 (0.27)   0.42 (0.25) * 
 FirmRD 0.44 (0.29)   0.44 (0.28)   
 UIRD 0.71 (0.25) *** 0.7 (0.24) *** 
 UTRD 0.1 (0.31)   0.12 (0.31)   
 ILO 0.39 (0.42)   0.22 (0.42)   
 Relief 0.12 (0.24)   0.15 (0.24)   
 TI -0.19 (0.38)   -0.13 (0.37)   
 UI 0.32 (0.28)   0.3 (0.28)   
 UnivRD 0.15 (0.24)   0.16 (0.23)   
 Groups 0.68 (0.32) ** 0.7 (0.32) ** 
 Pers 0.28 (0.25)  0.28 (0.24)   
 Technicians 0.72 (0.27) *** 0.67 (0.27) ** 
µ1  1.54 (0.14) *** 1.5 (0.14) *** 
    
Number of observations  226 226 
Log-likelihood Function logL  -179.54 -182.92 
Restricted 
Log-likelihood  -236.75 -236.75 
χ²-test  114.43 *** 107.66 *** 
Degrees of Freedom  37 32 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%.  
